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ESSAY
How Law Constructs Preferences
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades, social scientists have learned a great deal about how
people actually make decisions and choices.' Much of this work requires
qualifications of rational choice models.2 Those models are often wrong in the
simple sense that they yield inaccurate predictions. Decisions are affected by
cognitive limitations and motivational distortions that press choices in unanticipated directions. It follows that a normative account of rational choice (such as
expected utility theory) may well lack descriptive accuracy. 3 But it does not
follow that people's behavior is unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary, the departures
from rational choice can be described, used, and sometimes even modeled, at
least in broad outline. One of the most important findings-and the one I will
emphasize here-is that preferences and values often do not predate the moment of choice. Often preferences and values are constructed, rather than
elicited, by social situations. 4 People do not generally consult a freestanding
"preference menu" from which selections are made at the moment of
choice; preferences can be a product of procedure, description, and context, and
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political

Science, University of Chicago. This essay was the basis for the Ryan Lecture, delivered at Georgetown
University Law Center on October 8, 1997. It draws on Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, & David
Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages: (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J.
2071 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Christine
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming May 1998). The author would like to thank the members of the Georgetown
community for their extraordinary hospitality on that occasion. The reader is asked to make allowances
for remarks originally written for oral presentation. I am also very grateful to Christine Jolls, Daniel
Kahneman, David Schkade, and Richard Thaler for their help with joint work and for many discussions; none of them is responsible for errors here.
1. See RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1994); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 11 (1998).
2. There is of course much controversy in specifying what rational choice models require. Some of
the evidence I discuss shows how people react to the presence of decision costs, and it is far from
irrational to take those costs into account. It is also fully rational to consider the effects of social norms
on choice, since norm-violations can count as costs. It is far less important to struggle over the question
of whether the evidence shows violations of rationality than to be as clear as possible on how human
beings actually behave-it is the latter issue that I am concerned with here.
3. See, e.g., Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 185 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1996).

4. See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 364 (1995); Tversky,
supra note 3.
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all three of these may take different forms. "Alternative descriptions of the
same choice problems lead to systematically different preferences; strategically
equivalent elicitation procedures give rise to different choices; and the preference between x and y often depends on the choice set within which they
5
are embedded.",
This point is especially important for law. The legal system is pervasively in
the business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts for choice.
Of course the legal system creates procedures" descriptions, and contexts in the
course of litigated cases. For example, the alternatives (selected to be) placed
before the jury or judge may matter a great deal. Because people seek to avoid
the extremes, liability or conviction on some count A may very much depend on
the nature of counts B, C, and D. In this respect the preferences and values of
juries and judges may well be constructed by law. But similar points hold
outside of the courtroom as well. The allocation of legal entitlements and the
structures created for exchange (or nonexchange) by law may well affect both
preferences and values.

For purposes of analysis we might distinguish among three different academic tasks: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive work is concerned
with predictions. If, contrary to conventional assumptions, people dislike losses
far more than they like equivalent gains, predictions will go wrong insofar as
they rest on conventional assumptions. Law can play a constructive role in
helping to establish whether to frame something as a loss or as a gain. This
point has important implications for positive analysis of law, prominently
including the Coase theorem; 6 as we will see, it suggests that in one respect, the
Coase theorem is quite wrong. We will also see that if people are averse to

extremes, a problem will arise for a simple axiom of revealed preference
theory.7
Prescriptive work is concerned with showing how society might actually
reach shared goals; this is a central purpose of economic analysis of law.
Consider the following information campaigns, which conventional analysis
deems equivalent: (a) If you use energy conservation methods, you will save $X
per year; and (b) If you do not use energy conservation methods, you will lose
$X per year. It turns out that information campaign (b) is far more effective than
information campaign (a). 8 Some features of human judgment, properly understood, undermine conventional economic prescriptions about what will work
best; they help explain, to take just one example, precisely why the public
service advertising slogan "drive defensively; watch out for the other guy" is
particularly ingenious.

5. Tversky, supra note 3, at 186.
6. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
7. See Paul A. Sameulson, Assumption Theory in Terms of Neutral Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243
(1938).
8. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 124-25 (7th ed. 1995).
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Normative work is concerned with what the legal system should do. Recent
revisions in understanding human behavior, especially insofar as they suggest
the constructed character of preferences and values, greatly unsettle certain
arguments against paternalism in law. They do not make an affirmative case for
paternalism, but they support a form of anti-antipaternalism. If people are
unrealistically optimistic, they may run risks because of a factually false belief
in their own relative immunity from harm, even if they are fully aware of the
statistical facts. If people's choices are based on incorrect judgments about their
experiences after choice, there is reason to question whether respect for choices,
rooted in those incorrect judgments, is a good way to promote utility or welfare.
If, for example, people use heuristic devices that lead to systematic errors, their
judgments about how to deal with risks may be badly misconceived. If preferences do not predate situations of choice, and emerge in different forms
depending on procedure, description, and context, it becomes harder to fathom
what it even means to "override" a "preference." If this notion becomes
unclear, the meaning of paternalism itself requires a great deal more thought.
None of these points makes a firm case for legal paternalism. But they do
suggest that objections to paternalism should be empirical and pragmatic,
having to do with the possibility of education and likely failures of government
response; such objections should not be a prioriin nature.
I. DAMAGES
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

My principal emphasis here is on the broader implications of a recent
empirical study of punitive damages, undertaken by Daniel Kahneman, David
Schkade, and me. 9 Our study involved about 900 jury-eligible citizens in Texas;
each was asked to evaluate punitive damage cases, by saying: (a) how outrageous the defendant's conduct was, on a bounded scale of 0 to 6; (b) how much
the defendant should be punished, on the same bounded scale; and (c) how
much in the way of punitive damages the defendant should be expected to pay
on an unbounded scale of dollars. There were twenty-eight total scenarios. The
questions allowed measurement of the effects of the defendant firm's size
(which was varied), the effects of harm (in all cases, compensatory damages
were $200,000, but in some, the harm seemed qualitatively worse), and the
effects of context (all participants read one case in isolation, others together).
Here was the basic puzzle that we sought to explore: Frequently the legal
system requires judges or juries to make (normative) judgments of some kind
and then to translate those judgments into dollar amounts. This is of course the
task of juries who impose punitive damages. How does this translation take
9. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages: (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation
in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). The full study, with accompanying statistical analysis, appears in
Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and ErraticAwards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16
J. RiSK AND UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998). My discussion of our findings is my own, and Kahneman and
Schkade should not be blamed for errors.
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place? When the translation occurs, what is it that the legal system is doing?
Can the task be done well?
Our basic findings were as follows:
1. People have a remarkably high degree of moral consensus on the degree
of outrage and punishment that is appropriate for punitive damage cases.' ° At
least in the personal injury cases we offered, this moral consensus, on what
might be called outrage and punitive intent, cuts across differences in gender,
race, income, age, and education. For example, our study shows-through the
construction of "synthetic juries"-that all-white, all-female, all-Hispanic, allmale, all-poor, all-wealthy, all-black, all-old, and all-young juries are likely to
come to similar conclusions about how to rank and how to rate a range of cases.
There is one exception to this generalization. Though women and men rank
cases in the same way, women tend to rate cases more severely on the bounded
scales, and this effect is heightened when the plaintiff is female. (It could as
accurately be said that men tend to rate cases more leniently than women, and
this effect is heightened when the plaintiff is female.) But this modest difference
does not undermine our basic finding, which involves a striking consensus.
2. The consensus fractures when the legal system uses dollars as the vehicle
to measure moral outrage. Even when there is a consensus on punitive intent,
there is no consensus about the dollar amount that is necessary to produce the
appropriate suffering in a defendant. Under existing law, widely shared and
reasonably predictable judgments about punitive intent are turned into highly
erratic judgments about appropriate dollar punishment. A basic source of arbitrariness with the existing system of punitive damages (and a problem not limited to
the area of punitive damages) is the use of an unbounded dollar scale.
3. A modest degree of additional arbitrariness is created by the fact that
juries have a hard time making appropriate distinctions among cases in what
might be called a "no-comparison condition." When one case is seen apart from
other cases, people show a general tendency to place it toward the midpoint of
any bounded scale. It is therefore less likely that sensible discriminations will be
made among diverse cases. This effect is, however, far less important than the
effect identified in (2) in producing arbitrary awards.
4. Harm matters a great deal, even if compensatory damages are held
constant. The degree of outrage evoked by the defendant's behavior was not
affected by the harm that occurred, but varying the harm had a limited but
statistically significant effect on punishment ratings; defendants who had done
more harm to the plaintiff were judged to deserve greater punishment. Thus low
harm produced an average award of $727,599 and high harm an average award
of $1,171,251-a substantially greater amount.
10. Two qualifications are necessary. First, this conclusion is restricted to the area we investigated
involving personal injury suits. It is an open question whether the moral consensus would operate in
areas involving, for example, sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of race. Second, there
is a greater consensus on how to rank the scenarios than on the absolute numbers for outrage and
punishment.
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5. We hypothesized that the defendant firm's size would affect neither outrage nor punitive intent, but that the same degree of punitive intent would be
translated into a larger amount of damages when the firm is larger than when it
is smaller. As expected, we found no statistically significant effects of firm size
on either outrage or punishment judgments. But large firms were punished with
much larger dollar awards (an average of $1,009,994) than medium firms
($526,398). This is substantial evidence that equivalent outrage and punitive
intent will produce significantly higher dollar awards against wealthy defendants.
The most basic finding that emerges from this study is that outrage and
punitive intent are shared, but judgments about dollar awards are not. This is
because the legal system gives people no "modulus," or standard, by which to
assess different possibilities along the unbounded scale of dollars. If, for
example, $2 million in punitive damages were associated with a particular,
specified action, juries would have a "modulus" around which to organize their
intuitions. The legal system constructs jury's preferences for punitive awards by
asking them to come up with a number along the unbounded scale of dollars,
subject to instructions that are usually open-ended.
How might this problem be handled? Once we see that punitive awards are
constructed by the legal system's particular response mode--dollars-we can
specify the basis of complaints about the status quo, and generate appropriate
reforms. I consider three possible approaches.
If the basic problem is simple unpredictability, the legal system might reduce
that problem by asking juries not to come up with dollar amounts, but to rank
the case at hand among a preselected set of exemplar cases, or to use a bounded
scale of numbers rather than an unbounded scale of dollars. A conversion
formula, based on previously compiled population-wide data showing how
punitive intent corresponds to dollar awards, might be used to generate population-wide judgments about dollar amounts. Through this route, it would be
possible to reduce variability and to ensure that jury judgments about appropriate dollar punishments do not reflect the likely unrepresentative views of twelve
randomly selected people, but those of the population as a whole. The goal of
this approach would be to come up with the community's, rather than the
isolated jury's, judgment about appropriate dollar awards. This approach is
highly populist, because it seeks to obtain popular convictions. The result would
be a form of predictablepopulism.
If the basic problem is that people cannot sensibly map their moral judgments
onto dollar awards, the legal system should provide a mechanism by which
judges or administrators, rather than jurors, can translate the relevant moral
judgments into dollar amounts. It is reasonable to question whether ordinary
people can know what a given dollar amount would mean for, or do to, the
defendant or those in the position of the defendant. On this view, the jury should
also rank the case at hand in comparison to preselected cases, or come up with a
number on a bounded scale. A conversion formula, based not on population-
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wide data but on expert judgments about what various awards would actually
mean or do, would be used to produce rational judgments about dollar amounts.
This approach is a mixture of populist and technocratic elements. It is populist
insofar as it relies on the community's punitive intent; it is technocratic insofar
as experts come up with the relevant conversion formula. The result would be a
form of technocraticpopulism.
If the basic problem is that people's moral judgments are not the proper basis
for punitive awards, judges might, in some or all contexts, use those moral
judgments as one factor to be considered among others, or the legal system
might dispense with jury judgments entirely in some or all contexts. If, for
example, it is believed that existing social norms are not the appropriate basis
for punishment, or if deterrence rather than retribution is the appropriate goal of
punitive damages, an expert body might decide on appropriate awards, or offer
general guidance to trial court judges. Because this approach reduces or eliminates the jury and relies instead on specialists, it attempts a form of bureaucratic rationality.
For present purposes it is unnecessary to choose among these three approaches. My basic claim is that punitive damages reflect outrage that is often
widely shared, but dollar awards that can be quite variable. There are different
ways of handling that problem, from the most populist to the most technocratic.
The legal system inevitably constructs the preferences, or values, that emerge
from juries. The question is what normative judgments ought to inform the
choice of methods of constructing the relevant preferences and values.
B. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

Awards for compensatory damages raise many of the same questions as
punitive damages. Consider, for example, the issue of pain and suffering. To be
sure, such awards are nominally compensatory rather than punitive; they ask the
jury to uncover a "fact." But they also involve goods that are not directly traded
on markets, and they require a jury to convert into dollars a set of judgments
that are, at the very least, hard to monetize. In the absence of uncontroversial
market measures to make the mapping reliable,' l the resulting verdicts are
notoriously variable, in a way that raises questions'very much like those in the
punitive damages setting.1 2 Similar issues arise in the law of libel, which
notoriously lacks clear measures of damages.13 Here the jury is likely to be
11. An effort at disciplining decision is made in W. KIp Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
99-116 (1991).
12. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED
IN 1984, at 1-3, 18-19, 23-24, 40-42 (1987); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908 (1989); Mark Geistfeld, Placing A Price On
Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damagesfor Nonmonetary Injuries,
83 CAL. L. REv. 773 (1995); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensationor CapriciousAwards, 8 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 203, 204-08, 214-19 (1988).
13. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 782 (1986)
(discussing liability and damages in libel cases).
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mapping a complex judgment, about the quality of the harm and perhaps the
nature of the plaintiff and the defendant, oito an unbounded dollar scale. 4
The latter half of the twentieth century has also witnessed the rise of two
important new torts: intentional infliction of emotional distress 15 and sexual
harassment.' 6 Both of these torts are accompanied by damage remedies. With
respect to such remedies, the basic story should be familiar. Monetization is
extremely difficult. Significant arbitrariness is entirely to be expected; similar
cases may well give rise to dramatically different awards. With sexual harassment, variable awards are pervasive, and it is likely that some plaintiffs are
receiving too much and others too little. 17 How does a jury know what amount
would provide an employee, or a student, with adequate compensation for quid
pro quo or hostile environment harassment? What does compensation mean, in
practice? In both of these contexts, compensatory and punitive damages are
likely to be entangled, in the sense that juries probably do not sharply separate
the one from the other.
In the areas of intentional infliction of emotional distress and sexual harassment, there may well be a relatively uniform set of underlying judgments
among different demographic groups, though with sexual harassment it would
be most interesting to see whether there are differences between men and
women or among other groups. This is an intriguing and entirely feasible
empirical project along the lines of the study I have described here. A principal
source of unpredictability is likely to involve the translation of the underlying
moral judgments into dollar amounts. Hence reform strategies, here as elsewhere, might be based on a particular conclusion about what is wrong with the
outcomes of jury deliberations-unpredictable awards, inadequate understanding of the effects of dollar amounts, or a reliance on improper factors. The legal
system might restrict, or contruct, jury "preferences" in many different ways.
We can bring together these various grounds for compensatory awards by
noting how the reform proposals discussed above may or may not bear on
compensatory damages awards that are especially likely to be erratic. The most
important feature of compensatory damages is that they are intended to restore
the status quo ante.' 8 Punitive damages, by contrast, are intended to reflect a
14. There is also a predictable difference between the amount that would compensate a libel plaintiff
for injury inflicted and the amount that would persuade a libel plaintiff to allow his reputation to be
damaged in the relevant way. See generally Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive
Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REv. 1341 (1995).
15. See ROBERT KEETON & WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 54-66 (1984) for an overview.
16. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).

17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases (May 12, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the University of Chicago Law School). As yet there appears to be no
systematic study to this effect, but highly suggestive evidence comes from the literature on pain and
suffering damages, which shows such a pattern. See Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil
Jury Awards, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 243, 244-45 (1997), and research there cited.
18. Note in this regard the difference between the amount a plaintiff would require to deem himself
restored, and the amount a plaintiff would demand to allow the injury in the first instance. See
McCaffery et al., supra note 14.
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normative judgment about the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct (together with a judgment about deterrence). Thus the compensatory decision, far
more than the punitive decision, reflects an assessment of fact (at least in
theory).1 9 At first glance this is a sharp distinction between the two. In this light,
would it make sense to consider reforms designed respectively to (a) capture a
population-wide judgment about appropriate compensation, (b) capture a "compensatory intent" that would be mapped, by experts, onto dollar amounts, and
(c) dispense partly or entirely with juries on the ground that juries are unlikely
to have the competence to make accurate judgments about the factual
questions involved?
To answer this question, it is necessary to ask why juries are now charged
with the task of making judgments about appropriate compensation in cases in
which that inquiry strains their factual capacities. The most straightforward
answer is self-consciously populist. In cases involving libel, pain and suffering,
sexual harassment, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, no institution is likely to be especially good at uncovering the "fact" about compensation, if there is indeed any such "fact." Moreover, it is appropriate (on this
view) to let the underlying decision reflect not merely facts but also judgments
of value that are held by the community as a whole. 20 Whatever fact-finding
deficiencies the jury may have (as compared to, say, a specialized agency) are
overcome by the value of incorporating community sentiments into the decision
about appropriate compensation for injuries that are not easily monetized. On
this view, compensatory judgments, at least in these contexts, are not so
different from punitive judgments after all; both of them have important normative components.
Thus the simplest argument on behalf of jury judgments about compensation
is that any such judgment is-perhaps inevitably and certainly appropriatelynot solely compensatory. It has evaluative dimensions, both in deciding what
19. There are many complications here. An obvious issue is what, in this context, compensation is
compensation for. If someone has suffered a month of pain, is compensation supposed to restore the
plaintiff hedonically? To give dollar equivalents for injury to capabilities and functionings, to be
assessed in part objectively rather than subjectively? Because the idea of "compensation" does not
answer such questions, the jury's assessment inescapably creates normative issues. There is much room
here for further descriptive work (what are the components of that assessment, in fact?) and normative
work as well (what should the question of compensation be taken to mean in these various contexts?).
See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985) (defending a "capability" approach to an
assessment of well-being).
20. An underlying question, in all of these areas, involves the extent to which the damage judgment
should be person-specific. Suppose, for example, that an especially sensitive plaintiff has suffered an
especially severe hedonic loss as a result of libel or sexual harassment-or, by contrast, that an
especially tough-skinned plaintiff has suffered an unusually small hedonic loss as a result of the same
torts. Should a jury consider the extent to which the plaintiff's injury was objectively reasonable,
independent of purely hedonic factors? Officially, tort law incorporates a reasonable person inquiry at
the level of liability, but once the defendant has been found liable, the defendant must take the plaintiff
as the plaintiff experienced the injury. In other words, damages determinations are supposed to be
person-specific -but we do not know if juries are willing to think in these terms, and it is also unclear
that they should.
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compensation properly includes and in imposing burdens of proof and persuasion and resolving reasonable doubts. The evaluative judgments, it might be
thought, should be made by an institution with populist features and virtues.
The point may well apply to judgments about compensation for pain and
suffering, libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual harassment. A populist institution, on this view, should be permitted to undertake
evaluative judgments about what amount would compensate someone who has
suffered as a result of an improper medical procedure, a lie about his private
life, or an unwanted sexual imposition by an employer or teacher.
In many cases involving compensatory awards, however, the problem of
erratic judgments, emerging from scaling without a modulus, remains. This
problem would not be severe (indeed, it would not be a problem at all) if what
appeared to be erratic judgments were really a product of careful encounters
with the particulars of individual cases, producing disparate outcomes that are
defensible as such because they are normatively laden. But the study I have
described suggests grave reasons to doubt that this is in fact the case. Thus there
is a serious question of reform strategies.
How would the proposals discussed in Part IIA work here? Notice that for
compensatory damages, ranking is far preferable to rating along a bounded
scale. It is certainly useful to see how a jury believes that the injury at issue
compares with other injuries, but less useful, when punishment is not involved,
to get a sense of the jury's numerical rating. A ranking might be used in various
ways. If the basic problem is erratic judgments in the context of compensatory
damages, it might be desirable to use a conversion formula to obtain a populationwide judgment about appropriate compensation. A problem with this approach
is that a population-wide judgment about appropriate dollar compensation
might be ill-informed-it might not reflect "true" compensation. If the normative dimensions of that judgment seem to deserve a good deal of weight-if we
see the jury's judgment about compensation as appropriately reflecting considerations not involving the apparently factual question of compensation-this
approach might well make sense. But if the factual dimensions deserve to
predominate, the jury's ranking might be understood as a kind of "compensatory intent," to be converted to compensatory awards not by population-wide
data but instead by an administrative or legislative conversion formula rooted in
a judgment of the appropriate treatment of the cases against which the case at
hand has been ranked. This kind of reform seems somewhat awkward, for the
notion of "compensatory intent," supposedly rooted in a judgment about the
facts, is less straightforward than that of "punitive intent," which is an unmistakably normative judgment. But it would mix populist and technocratic elements
in a way that is mildly reminiscent of the treatment of social security disability
cases-though there the jury is not of course given a role, displaced as it is by
an administrative law judge.2'
21. See Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984). Note in this regard that many administrative
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If the social security disability cases are really taken as a good analogy,
technocratic considerations should predominate, and the third kind of reform
proposal might seem best. In this view, an administrative or legislative body
might create a kind of "pain and suffering grid," "libel grid," or "sexual
harassment grid," combining the basic elements of disparate cases into presumptively appropriate awards. A judge would produce a dollar award by seeing
where the case at hand fits in the grid and perhaps by making adjustments if the
details of the case strongly call for them. A technocratic approach of this kind
22
could eliminate or at least greatly reduce the problem of erratic awards.
Whether such an approach is desirable depends on the value of incorporating
populist elements in the way that the more modest reforms promise to do.
Elements of these various approaches can be found in reform proposals, thus
far restricted to the pain and suffering context, that attempt to cabin the jury's
judgment by requiring it to decide in accordance with damage schedules and to
place the case at hand in the context of other cases. 23 In view of the fact that
similar problems beset other areas of the law, there is no reason not to consider
similar reforms in the contexts of libel, sexual harassment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. A key issue is the appropriate role of technocratic and populist elements in the compensatory judgment. A judgment about
that issue will go a long way toward shaping reforms.
II.

Two IMPORTANT AVERSIONS

I now turn to two human aversions with special relevance to law's constructive character: aversion to losses and aversion to extremes.
A. LOSS AVERSION

People are especially averse to losses. They are more displeased with losses
than they are pleased with equivalent gains-very roughly speaking, twice as
displeased. 24 Contrary to economic theory, people do not treat out-of-pocket
costs and opportunity costs as if they were equivalent. Here the constructive
effect of law is extremely important, because law may frame consequences as a
loss or instead a gain, not least by creating the legal entitlement in the first
instance.
agencies impose civil and criminal penalties, and they are also in a position to scale without a modulus.
It would be extremely valuable to have a sense of their practice, and to know whether they have created
some of the same kind of variability discussed here.
22. There is also an underlying question about the relationship between rule-bound judgment and
particularistic judgment. Standards laid down in advance may leave room for erratic particularistic
judgments if they are open-ended; but if they are rigid and rule-like, they may prevent the reasonable
exercise of discretion to adapt to the particulars of the individual case. One issue here is how to
minimize both decision costs and error costs, and in the abstract it is hard to know how much constraint
on particularistic judgment will accomplish that task. For a good discussion, see generally Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
23. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 246; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 12, at 953.
24. See Daniel Kahnman et al., Experiment Tests of the Endowment Effect of Coase Theorem, in
THAYER, supra note 1, at 167, 175.
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Loss aversion has important implications for positive analysis of law. It
means, for example, that the Coase theorem is in one respect quite wrong.25
Contrary to the Coase theorem, the allocation of the legal entitlement may well
matter in the sense that those who are initially allocated an entitlement are likely
to value it more than those without the legal entitlement.2 6 The legal entitlement
may well create an endowment effect, that is, a greater valuation stemming from
the mere fact of endowment.27 This effect has been observed in many contexts. 28 Thus workers allocated a (waivable) right to be discharged only for
cause may well value that right far more than they would if employers were
allocated a (tradable) right to discharge at will.
There is a further point. Whether an event "codes" as a loss or a gain
depends on a range of contextual factors, including how the event is framed.
The status quo is usually the reference point, so that losses are understood as
such by reference to existing distributions and practices; 29 but it is possible to
manipulate the frame so as to make a change code a loss rather than a gain, or
vice-versa. Consider a company that says "credit card surcharge" versus "cash
discount;" or a parent who says that for behavior X (rather than behavior Y) a
child will be rewarded, as opposed to saying that for behavior Y (rather than
behavior X) a child will be punished; 30 or familiar advertisements to the effect
that "you cannot afford not to" have a certain product. In environmental
regulation, it is possible to manipulate the reference point by insisting that
policymakers are trying to "restore" water or air quality to its state at time X;
the restoration time matters a great deal to people's choices. 3 ' But for present
purposes, the most important source of reference point is the law-where has
the legal system placed the initial entitlement? Much research remains to be
done on the effects of this initial allocation. It bears, for example, on the
distinction between "subsidies" and "penalties" that has proved so crucial to
the law governing unconstitutional conditions; 32 that distinction can be understood as responsive to the phenomena of loss aversion and framing effects,
which very much affect different judgments about whether someone has been
subsidized or instead penalized.3 3
Loss aversion also raises serious questions about the goals of the tort system.
Should damages measure the amount that would restore an injured party to the
25. Daniel Kahneman et al., ExperimentalTests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98
J. POLT. ECON. 1325, 1343-44 (1990).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1342.
28. See id., at 1392-42; Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, in CASS R.

(1997).
29. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
30. Personal experience suggests that this works!
31. See Robin Gregory et al., The Role of Past States in Determining Reference Points for Policy
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Decisions, 55 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 195 (1993).
32. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1761-64 (3d ed. 1996).

33. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
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status quo ante, or should they reflect the amount that an injured party would
demand to be subject to the injury before the fact? Juries appear to believe that
the amount that would be demanded pre-injury is far greater than the amount
that would restore the status quo ante.34 The legal system appears generally to
see the compensation question as the latter one, though it does not seem to have
made this choice in any systematic way. The disparity has large implications for
the choice between liability rules and property rules. Property rules allow a
taking only via "willingness to accept;" liability rules frame the question in
terms of "willingness to pay." The economic literature on the choice between
the two generally does not recognize that the resulting valuations may be
dramatically different.3 5
B. EXTREMENESS AVERSION

As car salespeople and good advertisers well know, people are averse to
extremes. Whether an option is extreme depends on the stated alternatives.
Extremeness aversion gives rise to compromise effects. 36 In this as in other
respects, the framing of choice matters; the introduction of (unchosen, apparently irrelevant) alternatives into the frame can alter the outcome. When, for
example, people are choosing between some small radio A and a mid-size radio
B, most may well choose A; but the introduction of a third, large radio C is
likely to lead many people to choose B instead.3 7 Thus the introduction of
the third, unchosen (and in that sense irrelevant) option may produce a
switch in choice as between two options. Almost everyone has had an experience of switching to (say) the second most expensive item on some menu of
options, and of doing so partly because of the presence of the very most
expensive item.
Extremeness aversion suggests that a simple axiom of conventional economic
theory-involving the irrelevance of added, unchosen alternatives-is wrong. 3 8
It also has large consequences for legal advocacy and judgment, as well as for
predictions about the effects of law. How can a preferred option best be framed
as the "compromise" choice? When should a lawyer argue in the alternative,
and what kinds of alternative arguments are most effective? This should be a
central question for advocates to answer. Juries and judges may well try to

choose a compromise solution, and what "codes" as the compromise solution
depends on what alternatives are made available. In elections, medical interventions, and policymaking, compromise effects matter a great deal.

34. See McCaffery et al., supra note 14, at 1403.
35. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
36. See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287,
288 (1996).
37. Id.
38. See Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495 (1993).
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COOPERATION, BEING FAIR, AND APPEARING FAIR

Economists sometimes assume that people are self-interested. This may well
be true, and often it is a useful simplifying assumption. But people also may
want to act fairly and, more importantly, they want to be seen to act fairly,
especially but not only among nonstrangers. For purposes of understanding law,
what is especially important is that people may sacrifice their economic selfinterest in order to be, or to appear, fair; and they may punish people perceived
as unfair.
Consider, for example, the ultimatum game. 39 The people who run the game

give some money, on a provisional basis, to the first of two players. The first
player is instructed to offer some part of the money to the second player. If the
second player accepts that amount, he can keep what is offered, and the first
player gets to keep the rest. But if the second player rejects the offer, neither
player gets anything. Both players are informed that these are the rules. No
bargaining is allowed. Using standard assumptions about rationality, selfinterest, and choice, economists predict that the first player should offer a penny
and the second player should accept. But this is not what happens. Offers
usually average between 30% and 40% of the total. Offers of less than 20% are
often rejected. Often there is a fifty-fifty division. These results cut across the
level of the stakes and also across diverse cultures.
The results of the ultimatum game are highly suggestive.4 ° Perhaps people
will not violate norms of fairness, even when doing so is in their economic
self-interest, at least if the norm violations would be public. Do companies
always raise prices when circumstances create short-term scarcity? For example, are there social constraints on price increases for snow shovels after a
snowstorm, or for umbrellas during a rainstorm? It may well be that contracting
parties are reluctant to take advantage of the misfortunes of others, partly
because of social constraints on self-interested behavior. Here there is enormous
room for future work.
Experimental research also suggests that there can be a high degree of
cooperation in prisoners' dilemma situations, not only but especially when
people are speaking with one another.41 It is noteworthy to find the existence of
many laws that are rarely enforced but that seem to meet with widespread
compliance. Consider, for example, laws forbidding people from smoking in
public places. Such laws are obeyed partly because of private enforcement via
social norms. Would-be smokers are deterred because they would be perceived
to be flouting pervasive norms. Much remains to be learned about the relation39. See THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 282-288 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eds., 1995) for a general discussion.
40. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998).
41. See THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra note 39, at 111-73 for an overview. A
prisoner's dilemma arises when individually rational behavior produces collective harm. See EDNA
ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS, 18-21 (1977), for a lucid discussion.
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ship between law and norms, and on how law can help create new cooperative
norms, or promote the success of emerging ones.
IV. HEURISTICS AND BIASES

People make judgments about probability on the basis of heuristic devices,
responsive perhaps to high costs of inquiry and decision, that may often work
well but that tend to lead to systematic errors. The use of heuristics may not
reflect irrationality (especially if they minimize decision costs), but it may
produce serious problems at the individual and social levels. This work bears on
the demand for (and hence also the supply of) government services, including
regulation.
A. CASE-BASED DECISION THEORY

Heuristic devices are often used when the costs of deliberation are high; in
such cases, second-order decisions, operating as default rules, can make particularized assessments less necessary.4 2 An important way of reducing decision
costs is to make assessments on the basis of previous cases rather than through
calculation of relevant costs and benefits.4 3 In fact people often reason by
calling to mind particular cases and seeing how the problem at hand compares
44
with those cases; this can be an important method of reducing decision costs.
The construction of preferences and values stems from the law's selection of
salient cases.
The emphasis on case-based decisions, as a way of minimizing decision costs
while producing acceptably low error costs, has significant consequences for the
understanding of law. Adjudication usually involves a form of case-based
reasoning, and we may be able better to understand its nature, and its vices and
virtues, if we see it as an alternative to expected utility theory emerging from
the distinctive institutional characteristics of judicial institutions.
B. AVAILABILITY

People tend to think that risks are more serious when an incident is readily
called to mind or "available."- 45 If pervasive, the availability heuristic will
produce systematic errors. Assessments of risk will be pervasively biased, in the
sense that people will think that some risks (of a nuclear accident, for example)
are high, whereas others (of a stroke, for example) are relatively low. "Availability cascades" can produce a large demand for law, as in the familiar "pollutant
of the month" syndrome in environmental law. We lack a firm understanding of
42. See CASS R. SuNsTEtN & EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, SECOND-ORDER DECISIONS (Working Paper
no. 57, University of Chicago, Law and Economics Working Papers) (2d series 1998).
43. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, 110 Q.J. ECON. 605 (1995).
44. Id. at 607-10.
45. See W. Kw VisCusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 107-10
(1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heurisiticsand Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1129 (1979);
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how availability cascades occur and of how institutions might be designed to
produce appropriate responses.4 6
C. ANCHORING

Often people make probability judgments on the basis of an initial value, or
"anchor," for which they make insufficient adjustments.4 7 The initial value may
have an arbitrary or irrational source. When this is so, the probability assessment may go badly wrong. This point bears on jury and judge deliberations
reconstructing the facts. It also suggests possible problems with damage determinations, where arbitrary anchors can have large effects.
D. REPRESENTATIVENESS

Judgments about probability are often judgments about the likelihood that
some process A will bring about some event B. Under what circumstances will
driving produce significant increases in air pollution, or fatal accidents? When
will airbags produce risks to children? Do disposable diapers cause pollution
problems? In answering such questions, people ask about the extent to which A
is representative of B in the sense that it resembles B. This point suggests that
people will be insensitive to the sample size, misunderstand the phenomenon of
regression to the mean, have excessive confidence in their own judgments, and
misunderstand the effect on probability of base-rate frequency. 48 As a result,
people may systematically misunderstand risk levels. Risk regulation in general
and in particular cases may go awry.
CONCLUSION

I have attempted to sketch some of the ways that the legal system helps
construct preferences and Values-both by creating procedures, descriptions,
and contexts in courts themselves, and by creating entitlements that help shape
preferences and values in domains that might appear to have nothing to do with
law. In the area of punitive and compensatory damages, the legal system helps
construct the key variables by selecting the response mode, here one of dollars,
and also the context in which dollar awards are chosen. We have seen that
people's normative judgments, at least in personal injury cases, appear to be
remarkably uniform; their dollar judgments are not. Different response modes
might well work better, by diminishing arbitrariness or enabling people to do
something that they do well. Similar points apply in areas involving compensatory damages where erratic judgments are also likely. In those areas, large
questions involve the appropriate role of technocratic and populist features in
the operation of the legal system.
46. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (work in progress),
is an effort to deal with these issues.
47. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 45, at 1129.
48. Id.
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In the last decades, a great deal of progress has been made by assuming that
people have "preference maps" in their heads before the time of decision and
choice. For many purposes this assumption, whether or not true, has been
productive; certainly it has been a fruitful basis for the last generation of work
on the relation between law and human behavior. But the context of punitive
damages-where outcomes are palpably a product of procedure and where
arbitrariness is widely observed-is simply an especially vivid example of a
situation in which preferences and values do not, in any simple way, antedate
the process that is used to elicit them. The fact that preferences and values can
be a function of methods of elicitation, or construction, has a range of unexplored implications for law. I have attempted to trace a few of those implications here, and also to suggest several areas where future research would be
fruitful.
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